From "Take-it-or-leave-it" offers to "Take-it-or-be-left-out" Ultimatum - A trade mechanism for Online Services by Bodenstein, Christian et al.
FROM “TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT” OFFERS TO “TAKE-IT-OR BE-
LEFT-OUT” ULTIMATUM 
A Trade mechanisms for online services 
Bodenstein, Christian, University of Freiburg, Kollegiengebäude II, Platz der alten Synagoge, 
79085 Freiburg, Germany, christian.bodenstein@is.uni-freiburg.de 
Schryen, Guido, University of Freiburg, Kollegiengebäude II, Platz der alten Synagoge, 
79085 Freiburg, Germany, schryen@gmx.net 
Neumann, Dirk, University of Freiburg, Kollegiengebäude II, Platz der alten Synagoge, 
79085 Freiburg, Germany, dirk.neumann@is.uni-freiburg.de 
 
Abstract 
In a world, where more and more businesses seem to trade in an online market, the supply of online 
services to supply the ever-growing demand could quickly reach its capacity limits. Online service 
providers may find themselves maxed out at peak operation levels during high-traffic timeslots but too 
little demand during low-traffic timeslots, although the latter is becoming less frequent. At this point 
not only deciding which user is allocated what level of service becomes essential, but also the 
magnitude of the service provided, can be controlled by pricing. Pricing is an important factor when 
efficient and acceptable allocation of resources between individuals must be reached. Without prices, 
transferring or sharing goods would be impossible. In sharing information, pricing a product however 
is not as simple as relatively pricing an apple or a pear. Often the costs, and hence the prices are 
simply unknown. Backed by this scenario, the online services market could be combined with the 
market design mechanism of diamonds. For this we propose an ultimatum pricing strategy which 
effectively allows for valuations to be accounted for, but no longer a necessity when pricing in grid, 
cloud or other online computing environments. 
Keywords: Posted Price, Ultimatum Game, Energy Efficiency, Mechanism Design. 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
In a world, where more and more businesses seem to trade in an online market, the supply of online 
services to supply the ever-growing demand could quickly reach its capacity limits, but only for short 
time intervals. Online service providers, like Salesforce.com
1
, StrikeIron
2
, and eBay
3
 may find 
themselves maxed out at peak operation levels during high-traffic timeslots, but too little demand 
during low-traffic timeslots, although the latter is becoming less frequent. In some cases it might be 
possible to run certain tasks at night, but for some this is not an option, since some tasks need to be 
processed in a timely manner. At this point not only deciding which user is allocated what level of 
service becomes essential, but also the magnitude of the service provided, which can be defined by 
service level agreements (SLA). This allows for a rather simple method of reducing traffic, by only 
agreeing on a low service level, - but for some tasks, this is simply not an option. Log records may 
show that scientific networks peak in traffic before the submission deadlines of journals or workshops, 
since many scientists attempt to model or test their results before final submittal. Here, a low level of 
service is, again, of no use. The market can almost be branded as a high-demand type which is in dire 
need of some sort of energy supply regulation. An estimated 50%-70% (platform dependent) of total 
‘manageable’ costs of datacenters are energy costs. Additively, Gartner estimates, that the combined 
CO2 emissions, as a byproduct of energy expenditure, by the ICT-Industry has reached the emissions 
of the worldwide combined civilian airliner fleet. 
Similarly faced with a comparable high-demand, regulated-supply scenario is the market for raw uncut 
diamonds. The market for trading raw diamonds is held mostly by DeBeers distribution arm, the 
Diamond Trading Company (DTC), which sorts, values and sells approximately 90 % of the world's 
rough diamonds by value (Viljoen 2008). The DTC buys the stones from the producers, sells the gem 
stones to carefully inspected buyers by presenting them with a box of selected diamonds, naming a 
price, and giving the buyer a take-it-or-leave option. Most buyers’ suspect, those who do not buy at a 
sight are not asked back, effectively dropping out of the market (c.f.  TIME MAGAZINE, “Tightest of 
all” 1945). By buying most of the diamond mines, DeBeers Group effectively created a cartel, in 
which it can set the prices the buyers have to pay. Notable, is the extremely high demand for 
diamonds, and an artificially set, low supply. This way the DTC controls the amount of diamonds in 
the market, and which jeweler is permitted to cut the raw diamonds. 
Learning from this, the online services market could be combined with the market design mechanism 
that is borrowed from trading raw diamonds, as this mechanism seems adequate for online services as 
well. Transferring this market design to the market for online services, by selecting a specific pricing 
strategy, the suppliers could be reduced to only efficient suppliers, much like the DTC chooses only 
the best cutters. Combined with a prioritization of online service demands, merged with a green 
scheduling principle the energy requirements by the sector could be reduced, without forfeiting too 
many economic incentives and properties. 
The research question posed in this paper is: “Can `take-it-or-be-left-out’ (short TIBLO) trade 
mechanisms be applied to the market of online services to achieve favorable results?”  
Let the diamond miners be replaced with nodes supplying online services, the sight holders substituted 
with agents requiring services and DeBeers Group is exchanged with a scheduling agent (automated or 
as a virtual third party). Potential in this trading mechanism is the strong control the scheduler has over 
the price and output of the online services, similar to the control the cartel has over the diamond price 
and gem supply. To this point, the game is identical to a standard posted-price auction. New to the 
game is the threat to expel the agent which does not accept the offer posted by the scheduler. As will 
                                              
1 http://www.salesforce.com/ - CRM Software on Demand 
2 http://www.strikeiron.com/ - Data as a Service 
3 http://www.ebay.com/ - New & used electronics, cars, apparel, collectibles, sporting goods & more at low prices 
be shown in this paper, this threat is what keeps both agent parties from bidding/asking under-
/overvalued prices, resulting in fair prices. 
In previous work we showed a model which offered an energy efficient approach to scheduling in 
grid/cloud environments (self-citing). We assumed that all agents know their valuation of a single unit 
of CPU and were at least willing to post this offer. As a derivation of the greedy heuristic, the bidder 
with the highest valuation was allocated to the node with the least energy costs, followed by the 
second highest bidder who was allocated to the second most efficient node, etc. Table 1 shows an 
extract of the example schedule using the green heuristic algorithm, where each job is of unit size, and 
each job has 2 processing units available. For simplicity we assume a finite single period model: 
 
Nodes  Jobs  Job Allocation 
Node rn εn  Job bj  Node Job price 
N1 9 8  J1 20  N1 J2 17 
N2 11 4  J2 17   J4 13 
N3 10 12  J3 11  N2 J5 24 
    J4 13   J1 20 
    J5 24  N3 OFFLINE  
Table 1. Sample Job allocation using the green heuristic algorithm 
Applying the greedy heuristic (Stößer et al. 2007), would result in an allocation N1(J5, J1), N2(J3) and 
N3(J2, J4), while yielding a higher revenue, has considerably higher energy costs than the green 
heuristic, where the inefficient node was shut down, and J3 was not allocated since it was too 
expensive. We found however that not all agents had an incentive to truthfully report their valuations, 
let alone the fact that some agents may not even be able to valuate CPU power on their own since 
power usage by electronic devices, without the use of special measuring devices are rather concealed.  
In this work, we wish to propose an alternative trade mechanism to counter this incentive to misreport 
and unknown valuations, by proposing an ultimatum pricing strategy which effectively allows for 
valuations to be accounted for, but no longer a necessity when pricing in grid, cloud or other online 
computing environments. We will restrict our analysis only to the impact of posted price trades 
coupled with an ultimatum condition. Hence the contribution of this paper is threefold: 
• Devise a simplistic model that captures the essential problems in bidding strategies without 
being too complex to be tractable 
• Revise current pricing models to incorporate energy efficiency in their objectives 
• Incorporate posted price mechanisms to allow buyers with unknown valuations to 
participate, while keeping the bidding mechanism to allow for urgency signalling 
The paper is structured as follows. After a brief introduction to the topic, section 2 contains the 
requirements to online services and motivational scenarios, where the model may be applicable. In 
section 3, we will briefly discuss auctions and posted price mechanisms, and related work in this field. 
In section 4 we present a game-theoretic model showing the strategic implications of a posted price 
ultimatum game. The evaluation based on the motivational scenarios presented is covered in section 5 
followed by concluding remarks in section 6 which wrap up this work. 
2 MOTIVATIONAL SCENARIOS AND REQUIREMENTS  
Pricing is an important factor when efficient and acceptable allocation of resources between 
individuals must be reached. Without prices, transferring or sharing goods would be impossible. In 
sharing information, pricing a product however is not as simple like relatively pricing an apple to a 
pear. Goods can be weighed, used, thrown, - all properties which are of definite value to somebody. 
Information goods, or virtual services on the other hand are harder to price. In some cases users are not 
even aware of the costs involved, like for example the costs involved to perform a simple Google 
search are still largely unknown to the general user. The energy costs, of performing a Google search, 
are the equivalent of powering a light bulb for an hour. Based on this information on energy costs to 
transfer, store, update or use information in online services, pricing strategies can be derived, by 
relating them to the energy costs of the service. A positive side-effect of this approach is its immediate 
optimization of profit, directly dependant on the energy costs. This approach can be used for a number 
of scenarios in online services: 
2.1 Motivational Scenarios 
This paper is structured following the Design Science guidelines (Hevner et al. 2004) in attempt to 
develop a viable model and methodology for solving the important and relevant problem of high 
energy costs throughout the ICT industry. It is therefore necessary to show a few scenarios which 
firstly show what is meant by the term online services, and secondly already provide a rough idea of 
what is required of a model to function in the market for online services. To preserve generality, we 
found our analysis on the pricing channels, cloud computing, Mashups and hosting services. 
2.1.1 “Name Your Own Price” Channel 
“Name Your Own Price®”
4
 is a pricing mechanism where interested buyers pick a commodity and 
post an offer of how much they are willing to pay for that good. The seller may then accept or reject 
the offer. In practice, this mechanism results in slightly lower than market value prices, but not by 
much. Rational buyers therefore must obviously value the goods fairly. Priceline.com and its famous 
‘Name Your Own Price®’ service is one of the leading travel service providers for price-conscious 
travelers, which claims to offer the cheapest possible travel arrangements. Users input their desired 
departure location, destination, time horizon and price they wish to pay. They are then offered the 
cheapest travel package. Problematic however is the fact that the bids are not binding, in the sense that 
potential buyers use these portals more as an information source rather than buying directly. In this 
scenario, posted-price mechanisms coupled with an ultimatum shown in this paper could be useful, to 
bind customers to the service, while ensuring a fair match of low price offers through reputation.  
2.1.2 Cloud Computing 
The term “Cloud Computing" originated from diagrams where the technology architecture depicted 
the Internet as a “cloud” of services, describing how most users do not really see the hardware they 
access, therefore often being perceived as working “in the clouds”. Consumers of cloud computing 
services purchase computing capacity on-demand and are not concerned with the underlying 
technologies used to achieve the increase in server capability; they purchase the software as a service 
(SaaS). Current cloud computing providers like Amazon.com
5
 or Sun offer computing resources at 
fixed prices and are contracted by SLA’s, but unified pricing strategies have yet to be implemented. 
Posted-price auctions could offer an efficient pricing strategy which promotes efficiency and 
optimality when coupled with the right scheduling design. With respect to energy efficiency, the 
posted-price auction coupled with the green scheduling algorithm could prove useful and 
advantageous in achieving a much needed reduction of energy costs of data centers. 
                                              
4 ‘Name your own price’ mechanisms are  registered service marks of priceline.com Incorporated. 
5 http://aws.amazon.com/s3/ - Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) 
2.1.3 Mashup-as-a-Service 
A Mashup is a web application which combines data from multiple sources onto one interface. An 
example would be if a real-estate owner would link his location information onto Google Maps and 
providing it as a service. As the term Mashup implies it is an easy and fast, “mashed” integration of 
numerous data sources to provide a service neither of the original data sources intended. The concept 
of Mashup-as-a-Service, similar to cloud computing, would entail producing on-demand services, as 
the users need them, using third-party sources as inputs. A good example of on-demand pricing of 
services is Serena.com
6
, which provides business users with Web 2.0 tools to build business Mashups. 
Pricing is currently done through a subscription on a “per User, per Month” basis. Discriminatory 
pricing could attract more small scale users, who wish to simply provide for a ‘fire-and-forget’ 
application. Other examples could include Yahoo Pipes
7
, which is currently free of charge. 
2.1.4 Hosting Services 
Hosting services generally refer to web hosting services where many websites are hosted on one web 
server connected to the Internet. This is generally the most economical option for hosting as many 
people share the overall cost of server maintenance. Although posted-price strategies have been 
extensively used in modern markets, including an ultimatum could prove useful in pursuit of efficient 
allocation of resources. 
2.2 Requirements for Selling Online Services 
With the motivational scenarios defined, we can derive the requirements for online services. These 
requirements are set by the motivational scenarios and are real problems faced by the online services 
market (some contribute more to the importance of requirements than others), and are the absolute 
minimal requirement set to the model presented in this work. The mechanism is thus required to be 
compatible with scenarios of: 
1. Excess Demand / Supply (Sub-Market dependent). Resource allocation is not a problem, if 
sufficient resources are available. Especially for hosting services and Clouds, this is a big 
issue. The requirement is thus: “Are the strategies imposed under “normal circumstances” still 
dominant in cases of excess demand / supply?” 
2. Single bids. Contrary to requirement 1, the markets are not always saturated in 
demand/supply. Often they are underrepresented: “Does the mechanism still function when 
faced with only one buyer/seller against many sellers/buyers?” 
Obviously requirements 1 and 2 reflect the highly volatile nature of the market for online services. 
While an internet service provider finds that his traffic peaks around mid-day, when all employees 
check their personal e-mails, he might find that his traffic is lowest at 3 o’clock in the morning when 
most customers are asleep. Further, the model must meet the requirements of: 
3. Energy efficiency. Foremost, besides having feasible properties for market trading, the 
mechanism must promote the use of energy efficient allocation mechanisms. 
4. Individual Rationality. An important requirement for the mechanism is that both trading 
parties benefit from trade, and rational behavior is induced. By assumption, all agents are 
taken as risk-averse. 
5. Unknown valuations. It is important that the mechanism can process jobs with unknown or 
withheld valuations, since some buyers may be unaware of their own valuations. This could 
prove especially useful in the case of Mashups-as-a-service, where some tasks are so unique, 
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that pricing cannot be done given observation of historic prices, but also in other aspects of 
trading online services. 
6. Complexity. The mechanism should not introduce any unnecessary complexity, nor add any 
intractable problems to the trading environment. This is a must for all scenarios! It is of no use 
to derive a complicated trading scheme which is of no use because no-one can use it. 
7. Time preference. The users require resources in a timely manner; hence the trade mechanism 
may not take too long to decide which resource is allocated to a task, to avoid encroaching on 
the task deadline. 
If the above requirements are met, the TIBLO pricing mechanism presented in this work could prove a 
favorable alternative to current pricing mechanism used in trading online services. In the next section, 
we will briefly discuss auctions and posted price mechanisms, and related work. 
3 RELATED WORK 
Current research in Grid Computing has come up with numerous scheduling mechanisms to efficiently 
schedule supply and demand of computing resources. To provide incentives for resource suppliers, 
pricing mechanisms have been proposed and seem the most promising method to provide incentives 
for sharing resources. Although some networks (Folding@home, SETI@home etc.) do not 
compensate in payments, they are still able to attract resources by other means (interest, appeal to 
moral duty, etc.)  
For commercial use however these incentives are insufficient and often infeasible since a rational 
supplier would not willingly and knowingly forfeit profits and freely give them to a third party 
scheduler, who in turn makes money with it. Auctions, which have previously not only been used, to 
transfer assets from public to private hands, but also to uncover the valuations of bidders, seemed most 
promising in this regard. As long as each bidder knows his own valuations in form of a private value, 
the outcome of the auction in most cases awards the good to the bidder with the highest valuation 
(Krishna 2002). Without this information, sellers can only guess the average willingness to pay for 
each good they wish to sell, - by posting a fixed price.  
Wang (1998), among others, compared these two popular selling methods (auction and posted price) 
in a one-period correlated valuation model, and found that auctions were mostly preferred, since static 
pricing has been labeled as economically inefficient, as it does not include pricing the dynamic nature 
of resource requirements. In this work however we adapt static posted price to the discriminatroy 
posted price auction mechanism (Seifert, 2006). Several authors have investigated hybrid market 
institutions which combine auctions and posted price offers. Combining auctions with a posted buyout 
option was first noted by Lucking-Reiley (2000).  Hinz et al. (2008) developed an analytical model 
analyzing the effect of shared information on bidding behavior in a price auction variation of Name-
Your-Own-Price addressing the often hidden valuation still inherent to standard bids. 
According to Wang et al. (2004) combined auctions are not a new phenomenon, since in a pure 
auction institution the posted price can be set so high that it is never even considered as a bid, and in a 
posted price institution it is set so low, that no bids exist below it, implying that pure posted price or 
auction institutions are merely a polarization of the combined mechanism.  
These models however all rely on the assumption that the posted price depicts the highest possible 
achievable price, and it makes no sense to bid beyond the posted price (Seifert, 2006) since buyers 
prefer the posted price over the auction mechanism, if the posted price is less (or equal) to their own 
valuation of the product with at least a weak dominance.  
Currently there is no approach that satisfies all requirements imposed in section 2. In the next section 
we will present our own price-setting mechanism, which includes all the favorable properties of the 
APPO (Seifert, 2006), but is simple enough to be used in a fast and volatile market of trading online 
services, while still consorting to the ideals of ‘green’ scheduling algorithms, instead of profit 
maximization strategies. 
4 THE MODEL 
The model discussed, shows an alternative pricing mechanism for 
as an example, where the “task request” to be allocated is the storage of data fro
“suppliers” is the host of a server farm, the mechanism can be described as follows: A scientist wishes 
to store his research on a server at Amazon.com. She approaches Amazon and is faced with two 
options: Reveal her valuation, thereby 
the posted price by Amazon, which is subject to the prices of jobs currently on the system. Once the 
price has been determined, she can either accept the package offer, of storing her data o
rejection, her personal data is stored only such that Amazon can disclose her from ever trading at 
Amazon.com in future. This example simply explains the model we wish to present more formally in 
the following. 
In section 4.1 we initiate the
strategies of a single negotiation between a unit buyer and seller are uncovered. Section 
the effect of adding outside options to the
analysis of scenarios with uncertainty.
4.1 Benchmark Model
In a benchmark bilateral monopoly setting, which corresponds to a market with one buyer (
seller (A), the solution is rather simple. The individual, both as a consumer and producer is a small part 
of the market and can therefore take everyone else’s 
prices (Friedman 1990). The actions of the two individual
describe the posted price, ultimatum g
normal-form representation of a two
each player (Player 1 ≡ A, Player 2 
s2
B
}) once B has issued a request
• Player B sends a job request to 
• Player A offers a price 
• After A has posted a price, 
• Subject to ЅB, A can choose to trade with 
In other words the two strategies represent 
Figure 2. Game tree of the 
The strategy space Ѕ is defined by the Cartesian product of the individual strategies of the two players:
Ѕ = Ѕ
A
 · Ѕ
B
 = {(a,a), (a,r), (r,a
By game design, if Player A
summarized into an aggregate buyer
but is worth p = vB to B, resulting that when both reject, nothing is won: 
players will accept, since there is no outside option available, and without trade both are worse off as 
long as the posted price UB(p) 
online services. Using Amazon.com 
influencing the probability her job is accepted, or simply accept 
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Unique to this type of ultimatum game, is the convergence of welfare distribution to the 50/50 
Schelling point (Schelling, 1963), similar to the pie distribution game. Consider A has energy costs of 
executing a unit size job of 1 €, which is of value to B up to 3 € and the information is known by both 
agents. Monopoly pricing would suggest A charges a price of p = 3 (full welfare benefits to A) while 
competitive pricing would suggest p = 1 (full welfare benefits to B). Fair pricing would suggest equal 
distribution of welfare, resulting convergence towards p = 2, with at least a weak dominance. A 
however still does have some form of power, and may choose to charge slightly higher prices than p = 
2, but as 2 < p ≤ 3 the probability that B rejects the offer increases.  
Theorem 1: The threat to expel bidders from the game if they do not accept is credible.  
Proof sketch: Proving whether or not the threat of expulsion is credible or not is rather simple, 
following Schelling’s (1963) strategic principles of continuous negotiations and casuistry. The former 
is solidified by the public knowledge that any buyer who refuses the offer is expelled. According to 
Schelling (1963), the party threatening achieves commitment to execution not by the gains from 
actually executing the threat, but by pointing out the long-run value of accepting, regardless of his own 
losses. Hence for all s´i(.) ε S, S (a,a) is a dominant strategy Nash equilibrium since u(si(a), s-i(.)) ≥ 
u(s´i(.), s-i(.)). ■ 
Theorem 2: Even in his monopoly position the scheduler has a weakly dominant strategy to charge 
“fair” prices.  
Proof sketch: Casuistry, as a form of rationalization (Schelling, 1963), ensures that agents will even 
attend the market, in that the scheduler denies himself too great a reward from his monopoly position 
(which in effect is bolstered by the take-it-or-leave-it mechanism), effectively lowering his prices to a 
reasonable level: at the least, lower than profit maximizing prices. This becomes an important pricing 
principle when the scheduling agent is no longer the sole supplier of computing power. ■ 
More formally, to maximize (bj - en) the highest bidder should be allocated the most efficient node, 
which effectively results in an optimization of energy costs in the system, the pricing decision can be 
denoted mathematically by the following optimization function,  
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where cj denotes the amount of CPU resources required, xjnt corresponds to the decision variable 
unique for each time slot t, pjn is the discriminatory price subject to bj and en, bj represents the bid by 
agent j and en stands for the energy costs per CPU of node n. Additionally, bj ≥ rn. The atomicity, and 
time-feasibility constraints have been omitted, since for this case we look only at unit-size jobs which 
all have a duration of one time unit. 
4.2 Outside options 
The simple bilateral monopoly is now introduced with a third party service provider, like Amazon 
Web Services for example, which sells all services at a fixed price ps and pursues no further strategies 
but to accept all jobs until its capacity limit ks is reached. This third party is known to schedule its jobs 
in a “first-in-first-out” (henceforth referred to as the ‘FIFO-agent’) way, ignorant of its energy costs or 
CO2 emissions (this is not to say that Amazon is ignorant of energy costs). The TIBLO-agent (referred 
to as the ‘Seller’ in previous chapters) who includes energy efficient scheduling principles is now 
faced with the following payoff structure: 
 
 
 
A\B A R 
a p, (vB - p) 0, (vB - ps) 
r 0, (vB - ps) 0, (vB - ps) 
Table 3. Posted-price payoff matrix 
Hence when posting a price p, to a rational buyer who is ignorant of energy efficient principles, p ≤ ps 
which would result in an equilibrium strategy at Ѕ = {(a,a)}. Faced with an energy-aware buyer, A has 
to ensure that p ≤ ps + δ, where δ is the valuation of energy-awareness, which allows the TIBLO-agent 
to charge slightly higher prices than the FIFO-agent. This phenomenon can be found in many product 
pricing strategies where environmental factors are included in the product. Badenova
8
, a german 
power distributor for example, charged a higher price for their product “Regiostrom” (which draws 
50% of its power from regenerative resources) than their standard price power, which draws power 
from conventional ‘unclean’ sources.  
Since the FIFO-agent cannot discern the buyers without drawing some sort of signal prior to the 
pricing decision, the exploitation possibility of δ are limited. Hence 0 ≤ ps ≈ p ≤ P, where setting p = 0 
means that the buyer receives the full benefit of trade, and P implies full benefit to the sellers.  
Shown in its normal form, where the relative utility is p - ps: 
 
A\B a R  A\B a r 
 a ++ , + 0, -  A ++ , - 0, + 
r 0, - 0, -  R 0, + 0, + 
                        p < ps            p > ps 
Table 4. Posted-price relative utility matrix 
Even with outside options, theorem 1 and 2 still hold. Since the TIBLO-agent is faced with an outside 
option, the credibility of the threat to expel the agent only diminishes with p → P. As implied by 
casuistry (Schelling, 1963) and reinforced by upholding his reputation to expel rejecting buyers, his 
pricing strategy is now limited to the space (0; ps + δ), where δ = 0 for ignorant buyers, and δ > 0 for 
energy-aware buyers. Again, since the TIBLO-agent cannot discern ignorant from aware buyers, to 
keep his threat credible, the TIBLO-agent is forced to abandon his price setting position, resulting p ≤ 
ps. This is an important result since by pledging the threat of expulsion, the TIBLO-agent, given 
outside options, effectively loses his price setting trait. Knowing this, buyers should continue to 
approach the TIBLO-agent for online services. In section 4.3 the model presented is extended to 
include more than one interested buyer with different valuations. 
4.3 Bayesian case 
The simple bilateral monopoly is now introduced with a third party service provider and at least one 
further buyer interested in the online service product. Without loss of generality let’s assume that the 
single, continuum of energy-aware buyers is split into two aggregate buyers, B
L
 representing the low 
valuation buyers with vB
L
 and B
H
 representing the high valuation buyers with vB
H
, the game outcome is 
somewhat more complex, where A does not know in advance whether B is of type 
L
 or 
H
. In fact, B 
does not even know his relative valuation position to other bidders, but only his own valuation. To 
describe this scenario, the game is extended to a Bayesian TIBLO game with incomplete information, 
which can be depicted as follows:  
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 Figure 5. Game tree of the extended Bayesian 
More formally, as a game of incomplete information, the 
the standard posted price game and a probability 
transforming the game of incomplete information into 
Essentially, the strategies imposed by the benchmark 
of the game. The agent is forced by his own credibility to offer such prices that the trading partners 
will definitely agree on. Since 
to him, the sub-game for each 
From A’s point-of-view however he is faced with two or more buyers for a finite amount of goods. 
The decision which job is sche
single unit of CPU available, is faced with two buyers 
size job, which can be processed with just 1 unit of CPU. The power costs of 
his job at 3€ and B2 at 5€. Given full information, 
3.50€, who should as a rational buyer accept the offer.
knows the probabilities that the buyer currently under decision is either the one with a high valuation 
or a low valuation. The dilemma faced by 
• Post a price of 2€ which would satisfy both the low and high valuation buyers, and definitely 
ensure that both players would accept if asked 
faced with a high valuation buyer.
• Post a price of 3.50€
accepted by B2. In this case however
Generally it can be shown that if the 
and expects a necessity of future trades, he has a strong incentive to keep both agents.
due to the high value of future trades, which exceeds the surplus in a single trading opportunity.
For too high prices, the buyers will call the threat, and reject: If at this point the 
expel the partners, he loses all credibility and
the case if trading is transparent, and all buyers know of the actions of all other buyers in the market. 
Pending some sort of communications platform, this is however rarely the case. Therefore, e
has to act in maximizing his own utility, which results in the same principle stated in theorem 1
5 IMPLICATIONS FOR ONL
In this work we proposed the use “take
online services, combined with the energy 
consumption by online services
providers compared to the status quo
TIBLO game. 
TIBLO-game consists of 2 players, similar to 
π which determines the nature of the buyers, 
one of imperfect information (Harsanyi 1968).
TIBLO model still hold for the Bayesian version 
B maximizes his utility based on only the current information available 
B with A is merely the benchmark game, with one seller and one buyer.
duled is derived from the bidders’ valuations. For example, 
B1 and B2 who both request resources for a unit
A should invite and offer the CPU to 
 But given incomplete information, 
A is as follows: 
but forfeits a possible surplus of 1.50
 
 which would cause B1 to reject with positive probability, but still be 
 A forfeits all future trade opportunities with 
TIBLO-agent is faced with two buyers for a single commodity, 
 no longer is able to set the prices. This however is only 
INE SERVICES 
-it-or-leave-it” trade mechanisms to be applied to the market of 
efficient algorithm to effectively reduce energy 
 without forfeiting too much return. The implications
, using the TIBLO-pricing strategies are threefold
 
 
 
A who has a 
-
A are 2€ and B1 values 
B2 at a price of 
A merely 
€ if he is 
B1. 
 This is largely 
  
TIBLO-agent does not 
ach buyer 
 and 2. 
 for online service 
: 
• Possibility and environmental obligation to reduce energy inefficient allocation of resources to 
operating tasks 
• Self-induced, yet still profitable control of monopolies, resulting in fair, welfare maximizing 
pricing strategies 
• A steady, quantifiable, and most importantly, a forecast-able demand, thanks to the binding 
properties of the ultimatum mechanism allowing for optimal resource availability planning. 
Therefore the TIBLO-mechanism has proven to be not only a viable alternative, but a real first-choice 
option when prioritizing the reduction of high energy costs, as it adhered to all the requirements set out 
in section 2.2. For the motivational scenarios, this implies the following: 
• “Name your own price” Channel – By including an ultimatum to the search mechanism, 
price-scouting behavior by free riders can be reduced, since they will naturally reject the offer 
by Priceline.com, for example of a flight from Germany to Hawaii, and be banned from the 
system as a result. This way, name-your-own-price online services ensure that users will offer 
real prices, which ultimately could lead to an improved trading platform. 
• Cloud Computing – Clouds and Grids yet have to decide on a common pricing system. A first-
mover to employ TIBLO-pricing strategies would have a significant advantage than if he 
introduced the system in an already embedded market, where the new pricing mechanism may 
come across skepticism. TIBLO-pricing could offer an efficient pricing strategy which 
promotes efficiency and optimality when coupled with the right scheduling design resulting in 
achieving a much needed reduction of energy costs of data centers, as well as economically 
viable and welfare-distribution maximizing prices. 
• Mashup-as-a-Service – To best illustrate the benefits of deploying TIBLO-pricing strategies 
by Mashup providers, we pick up the example of Mashups-on-demand by Serena.com. Pricing 
is currently done through a subscription on a “per User, per Month” basis. Discriminatory 
pricing could not only attract more small scale users, who wish to simply provide for a ‘fire-
and-forget’ application, but also increase profits relative to decreased energy costs. 
• Hosting Services – Although the market for hosting services is already embedded by posted 
prices offers, the addition inherent to the TIBLO-mechanism could prove a very effective tool 
to reduce energy costs of datacenters while keeping service profits untouched. 
By being able to control the allocation, and effectively, the distribution of resources, one might label 
the mechanism as a centrally planned micro-economy. Political economists often argue that central 
planning is the only way that rational buyers can be forced to choose environmental optimization over 
profit maximization, since CO2 emissions, for example, are externalities which are not included in the 
optimization calculation. Additionally, environmentally friendly solutions are often more expensive 
than unclean sources. 
Allowing a corporate individual to control the market in such a way, standard microeconomic theory 
suggests that market power would transform this individual to a monopolist, resulting in monopoly 
prices. This is not the case with the TIBLO mechanism, as by issuing a threat of expulsion, the 
monopoly becomes self-regulated, as shown in the above model. The resulting prices and allocation 
however still remains feasible and profitable. 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this work we presented a mechanism which presents online service providers with a pricing model 
combined out of a posted price ‘auction’ and an ultimatum. It presents service providers with the 
option to reduce energy costs of their resource centers by invoking a discriminatory pricing 
mechanism which allows for a ranking of requests, without immediately confounding to direct 
monopoly pricing. This is largely due to the effect, that the provider must uphold his credibility of 
expelling agents who refuse to abide to his terms. In fact, the resulting self-imposed 50/50 ‘Schelling 
price’ results in a welfare maximum. 
Even without a valuating bid, the TIBLO-pricing can still offer a standardized price package, 
obviously to lesser terms to keep up the incentives to bid. Also by binding the users to the service, 
suppliers are more able to foresee demand spikes, and prepare accordingly, lessening the impact of 
excess demand spikes, possibly through prioritization. 
Most importantly, the model can achieve its goal of allocating important (signaled by the valuation) 
jobs to efficient nodes, which constitutes an important design goal for all future IT-services, Green-IT. 
Regardless, in future work we intend to expand the current TIBLO model to include further aspects 
which may be important for online services, or even other markets. This includes: 
• Extending the TIBLO mechanism to include a bidding possibility to pay prices larger than the 
posted price, which would include a further urgency lever based on the valuation of others in 
direct competition over resources in our model, knowing the bids of others. 
• Expanding the application scenarios to other trading environments in the online services 
market 
• Performing an online field study to evaluate the real response of bidding agents who are not 
necessarily always risk averse or even irrational at times. 
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